Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of
Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
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)
)
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CG Docket No. 02-278
REPORT AND ORDER AND FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING
Adopted: February 15, 2024 Released: February 16, 2024
Comment Date: [30 days after publication in the Federal Register]
Reply Date: [45 days after publication in the Federal Register]
By the Commission: Chairwoman Rosenworcel and Commissioner Gomez issuing separate statements.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) restricts robocalls and robotexts, absent
the prior express consent of the called party or a recognized exemption.
1
A consumer’s right to revoke
consent after deciding they no longer want robocalls or robotexts is essential to the right of consent. Over
many years, the Commission has addressed consent and revocation. Here we take steps both to establish
new consent protections and to make explicit those protections the Commission failed to codify in the
past. More specifically, we strengthen consumers’ ability to revoke consent so that it is simple and easy,
codify previously adopted protections that make it simpler for consumers to revoke consent, and require
that callers and texters implement requests in a timely manner.
2
We also seek comment on whether the
TCPA applies to robocalls and robotexts from wireless providers to their own subscribers and seek
comment on the ability to revoke consent and thereby stop these communications.
II. BACKGROUND
2. The TCPA prohibits initiating “any telephone call to any residential telephone line using
an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the called
party” unless a statutory exception applies or the call is “exempted by rule or order by the Commission
under [section 227(b)(2)(B)].”
3
The TCPA also prohibits, without the prior express consent of the called
1
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (1991), codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 227. The TCPA does not define prior express consent or otherwise provide guidance relating to how consumers
may provide or revoke consent to receive robocalls. The TCPA excepts from this prohibition calls made for
emergency purposes. The Commission has also exercised its statutory authority to adopt certain exemptions from
this prohibition. See 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(3), (9).
2
As discussed in more detail below, the TCPA regulates any call made using an “automatic telephone dialing
system” or an artificial or prerecorded voice. The Commission has confirmed that a text message sent using an
autodialer is a “call” subject to the TCPA. Any such call is considered a “robocall” or “robotext” for purposes of
this proceeding. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). See also Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946 (9th Cir.
2009) (noting that text messaging is a form of communication used primarily between telephones and is therefore
consistent with the definition of a “call”).
3
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B). In the case of robocalls that introduce an advertisement or contain telemarketing, the
Commission’s rules require that the caller obtain the prior express written consent of the called party. See 47 CFR
§ 64.1200(a)(2), (3).
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2
party, any non-emergency call made using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or
prerecorded voice to any telephone number “assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service,
specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the
called party is charged for the call” unless a statutory exception applies.
4
3. Consent to Calls from Wireless Carriers. In 1992, the Commission concluded that
wireless carriers need not obtain “additional consent” from their own subscribers prior to initiating
autodialed or artificial or prerecorded voice calls to those subscribers.
5
In 2019, two petitioners sought a
ruling that wireless subscribers can stop robocalls and robotexts from their wireless service provider by
making a request to their service provider to halt these communications.
6
4. Opt-out Confirmation Texts. In 2012, the Commission ruled that sending a one-time text
message confirming a consumer’s request that no further text messages be sent from that sender does not
violate the TCPA if the confirmation text complies with certain limitations, including that it not contain
any marketing.
7
In 2019, Capital One filed a petition requesting a declaratory ruling that, if a consumer
who has consented to receive multiple types of informational messages from a sender then revokes
consent, the sender should be able to clarify the scope of the revocation in a one-time message without
violating the TCPA.
8
Capital One notes that it sends customers a variety of different categories of
informational text messages, including fraud alerts, payment responses, low balance alerts, and overseas
transaction alerts.
9
5. Revocation of Consent. In 2015, the Commission clarified that consumers who have
provided prior express consent to receive autodialed or prerecorded calls may revoke such consent
through any reasonable means.
10
Citing prior Commission rulings and the “well-established common law
right to revoke prior consent,” the Commission concluded that the most reasonable interpretation of “prior
4
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).
5
See Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protect Act of 1991, CC Docket No. 92-90,
Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd 8752, 8774, para. 45 (1992) (1992 TCPA Order).
6
See Lucas Cranor Petition for Declaratory Ruling Requesting Order Granting That Consumers have the Right to
Revoke Consent Under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, CG Docket No. 02-278 (filed Dec. 17, 2019)
(arguing that “consumers have the right to revoke consent from receiving unwanted marketing text messages from
their wireless providers at any time by any reasonable means; and that wireless providers must honor these
revocation requests immediately”) (Cranor Petition); Petition of Paul Armbruster for Declaratory Ruling Or
Alternatively A Rulemaking Regarding A Consumer’s Absolute Right to Revoke Consent to Receive Unwanted Text
Messages From Common Carriers, CG Docket No. 02-278 (filed July 9, 2019) (requesting confirmation that a
cellular phone customer can revoke consent to receive any and all unwanted text messages from their cell service
provider) (Armbruster Petition).
7
See Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Soundbite
Communications, Inc., CG Docket No. 02-278, Declaratory Ruling, 27 FCC Rcd 15391, 15394, para. 7 (2012)
(Soundbite Declaratory Ruling or Soundbite).
8
See Capital One Services, LLC, Petition for Declaratory Ruling, CG Docket Nos. 18-152 and 02-278 (filed Nov. 1,
2019) (arguing that, “if the sender of a lawful informational text message transmitted through an automatic
telephone dialing system (‘ATDS’) receives a valid opt-out request from the recipient in response to that message,
and that informational message was part of a program in which the recipient had previously enrolled that transmits
several categories of informational messages, then, pursuant to the Commission’s ruling in Soundbite, the sender
may clarify in an opt-out confirmation message to the recipient the scope of the recipient’s opt-out request without
violating the [TCPA] or related Commission rules”) (Capital One Petition).
9
Id. at 4.
10
See Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-
278, WC Docket No. 07-135, Declaratory Ruling and Order, 30 FCC Rcd 7961, 7993-99, paras. 55-70 (2015) (2015
TCPA Declaratory Ruling).
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express consent” in light of the TCPA’s consumer protection goals is “to permit a right of revocation.”
11
In so doing, the Commission indicated that “to allow callers to designate the exclusive means of
revocation would, at least in some circumstances, materially impair that right.”
12
As a result, the
Commission concluded that a consumer “may revoke his or her consent in any reasonable manner that
clearly expresses his or her desire not to receive further calls, and that the consumer is not limited to using
only a revocation method that the caller has established as one that it will accept.”
13
6. In 2016, Mobile Media Technologies (Mobile Media) filed a petition asking the
Commission to clarify that the TCPA does not require a party transmitting a text message to create or
make available to consumers a specific or particular method (such as bilateral text messaging, in which
the consumer may revoke consent by replying “STOP”) by which a consumer may revoke prior express
consent to be texted.
14
7. TCPA Consent NPRM. On June 9, 2023, the Commission released a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking
15
that proposed to amend our rules to: 1) strengthen the right of revocation by specifying
reasonable methods to revoke while codifying the underlying right to revoke by any reasonable means;
16
2) require that, within 24 hours of receipt, callers must honor company-specific do-not-call and revocation
of consent requests for robocalls and robotexts that are subject to the TCPA; 3) codify the Commission’s
Soundbite Declaratory Ruling clarifying that a one-time text message confirming a consumer’s request
that no further text messages be sent does not violate the TCPA or the Commission’s rules as long as the
confirmation text merely confirms the called party’s opt-out request and does not include any marketing
or promotional information, and the text is the only additional message sent to the called party after
receipt of the opt-out request;
17
and, 4) require wireless providers to honor their customers’ requests to
cease autodialed, prerecorded voice, and artificial voice calls, and autodialed texts.
18
8. In general, commenters support the goal of providing consumers with the ability to
revoke consent to robocalls and robotexts that they do not wish to receive in a timely manner by codifying
11
Id. at 7994, 7997, paras. 57-58, 66 (citing Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991; Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005; Application for Review filed by Anda, Inc.; Petitions for
Declaratory Ruling, Waiver, and/or Rulemaking Regarding the Commission’s Opt-Out Requirement for Faxes Sent
with the Recipient’s Prior Express Permission, CG Docket No. 02-278, 05-338, Order, 29 FCC Rcd 13998 (2014)
(Anda Order); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892A, cmt. i. (1979) (“consent is terminated when the actor knows
or has reason to know that the other is no longer willing for him to continue the particular conduct”)).
12
2015 TCPA Declaratory Ruling, 30 FCC Rcd at 7997, para. 66.
13
Id. at 7998-99, para. 70.
14
See Petition of Mobile Media Technologies for Declaratory Ruling or, In the Alternative Retroactive Waiver, CG
Docket No. 02-278, WC Docket No. 07-135 (filed April 5, 2016) (Mobile Media Petition).
15
See Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-
278, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 23-49 (2023) (TCPA Consent NPRM).
16
Id. at paras. 9-12. The Commission proposed to clarify that reasonable methods to revoke consent typically
include revocation requests made by text message, voicemail, or email to any telephone number or email address at
which the consumer can reasonably expect to reach the caller. As a result, when a consumer uses any such method
to revoke consent, the Commission proposed that doing so creates a presumption that the consumer has revoked
consent, absent evidence to the contrary.
17
Id. at paras. 16-20. In addition, the Commission proposed to codify that senders can include a request for
clarification in the one-time confirmation text, provided the sender ceases all further robocalls and robotexts absent
an affirmative response from the consumer that they wish to receive further communications from the sender.
18
Id. at paras. 21-26. To effectuate this change, the Commission proposed to alter our prior ruling to require
wireless providers to subject such calls to certain conditions pursuant to an exemption that protects the privacy
interests of subscribers.
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those obligations into the Commission’s rules.
19
Several commenters, however, take issue with the
specific proposals set forth in the NPRM as discussed below.
III. DISCUSSION
9. In this Order, we clarify and strengthen consumers’ rights under the TCPA to grant and
revoke consent to receive robocalls and robotexts. Specifically, we adopt rules to: 1) make clearer that
revocation of consent can be made in any reasonable manner; 2) require that callers honor do-not-call and
consent revocation requests within a reasonable time not to exceed 10 business days of receipt; 3) limit
text senders to a one-time text message confirming a consumer’s request that no further text messages be
sent, as well as confirming that any revocation of consent applies only to those robocalls and robotexts for
which consent is required under the TCPA.
A. Revoking Consent in Any Reasonable Way
10. We strengthen consumers’ right to revoke consent by any reasonable means by codifying
the right and ensuring callers and texters do not unduly restrict it.
20
We believe this will make clearer to
callers and consumers that a consumer has a right to revoke consent under the TCPA. Specifically, we
codify a new rule that will make clear that consumers may revoke prior express consent for autodialed or
prerecorded or artificial voice calls and autodialed texts in any reasonable manner that clearly expresses a
desire not to receive further calls or text messages, and that callers may not infringe on that right by
designating an exclusive means to revoke consent that precludes the use of any other reasonable method.
11. We agree with commenters who contend that further clarification as to the methods that
are “reasonable” to revoke consent promotes the interests of both consumers and callers by ensuring that
such requests are honored.
21
These commenters contend that ambiguous or overly broad interpretations
of “reasonable methods” to revoke consent subject them to compliance burdens and potential liability.
22
We agree that further clarification is warranted to aid callers in complying with the obligation to process
revocation requests made by consumers using any reasonable means. Specifically, we adopt a new rule
that makes clear that any revocation request made using an automated, interactive voice or key press-
activated opt-out mechanism on a robocall; via a response of “stop” or a similar, standard response
message sent in reply to an incoming text message;
23
or submitted at a website or telephone number
provided by the caller to process opt-out requests constitute examples of a reasonable means to revoke
consent. If a called party uses any such method designated by the caller to revoke consent, we consider
that consent to be definitively revoked by a reasonable means, and future robocalls and robotexts from
that caller must be stopped. When the caller offers such a means to revoke consent, that caller cannot
allege that the use of such a mechanism by the called party is unreasonable. Any such request made by
these specific means constitutes absolute proof that the called party has used a reasonable means to
revoke consent.
12. We agree that the Commission should adopt a standardized list of the specific words that
may be used to revoke consent via a reply text message to ensure that automated systems can process
such requests.
24
Specifically, we find that using the words “stop,” “quit,” “end,” “revoke,” “opt out,”
19
See, e.g., Capital One Comments at 2; Cargo Comments at 7; NCLC et al. Comments at 1; PACE Comments at 3.
20
See 2015 TCPA Declaratory Ruling, 30 FCC Rcd at 7993-99, paras. 55-70 (noting that, “because the TCPA does
not speak directly to the issue of revocation, the Commission can provide a reasonable construction of its terms”).
21
See, e.g., ABA Comments at 6; EEI Comments at 12 (requesting that the Commission further clarify what
methods of revoking consent are reasonable); NTCA Comments at 1 (encouraging additional guidance); PACE
Comments at 4-6.
22
See, e.g., GECU Comments at 1-2; UHG Comments 4; Vibes Comments at 5-6.
23
See infra para. 12.
24
See, e.g., ABA Comments at 13; EEI Comments at 12; MEF Comments at 3; PACE Comments at 4; Vibes
Comments at 6; ACA Reply Comments at 3.
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“cancel,” or “unsubscribe” via reply text message constitutes a per se reasonable means to revoke
consent.
25
For purposes of revoking consent via a reply text message, the record confirms that both
consumers and the industry commonly use these specific words to convey a reasonable and unambiguous
intent to revoke consent.
26
In addition, the record suggests that callers can use automated means to
process these words in order to honor revocation of consent requests.
27
13. This does not preclude, however, the use of other words and phrases to revoke consent.
If the reply text contains words or phrases other than those listed above, and should any dispute on this
point arise, the text sender, who is responsible for processing the revocation request, will have an
opportunity to explain why the consumer’s use of alternative words or phrases does not constitute a
reasonable means to revoke consent. In these situations, the Commission or the court as the finder of fact
will conduct a totality-of-circumstances analysis to determine whether the request to revoke consent has
been conveyed in a reasonable manner. Consistent with the 2015 TCPA Order, when assessing whether
any particular means of revocation used by a consumer is reasonable, the finder of fact will look to the
totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the specific situation, including, for example, whether
the consumer had a reasonable expectation that they could effectively communicate their request for
revocation to the caller in that circumstance, and whether the caller can implement the mechanisms to
effectuate a requested revocation without incurring undue burdens.
28
We believe this approach balances
the ability of consumers to easily stop unwanted text messages with the ability of text senders to
reasonably process such requests.
14. Although we confirm that there is no mandate that texting parties transmitting an
autodialed text message must provide consumers with any specific means to revoke consent, such as
through the use of reply text messages, we caution that this is a reasonable and widely recognized means
for text recipients to revoke prior consent to text messages.
29
There may be instances, however, where a
text initiator chooses to use a texting protocol that does not allow reply texts.
30
We adopt a rule that, in
those instances, requires the text initiator to: (1) provide a clear and conspicuous disclosure in each text to
the consumer that two-way texting is not available due to technical limitations of the texting protocol; and
(2) clearly and conspicuously provide reasonable alternative ways for a consumer to revoke consent, such
as a telephone number, website link, or instructions to text a different number to revoke consent from
further unwanted text messages.
31
We recognize that character limits on text messages necessitate that
such disclosures will need to be succinct to avoid unduly infringing on the sender’s ability to
communicate using a text message.
25
Where a texter sends a consumer messages in a language other than English at the consumer’s request and the
consumer attempts revocation in that language using its equivalent of these words, the finder of fact may conclude
the revocation attempt is reasonable under a totality of the circumstances analysis.
26
The record confirms that these specific words are industry standards that are recognized by automated systems to
process opt-out requests made via a reply text message. See, e.g. ABA Comments at 13; EEI Comments at 12; MEF
Comments at 3; PACE Comments at 4; Vibes Comments at 6; ZipDX Comments 3.
27
See, e.g., ABA Comments at 13; EEI Comments at 12.
28
See 2015 TCPA Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 7996, n.233.
29
See, e.g., CTIA, Messaging Principles and Best Practices 5.1.3 (May 2023), available at
https://api.ctia.org/wpcontent/uploads/2023/05/230523-CTIA-Messaging-Principles-and-Best-Practices-FINAL.pdf.
30
See, e.g., Mobile Media Petition.
31
The issues raised in the Mobile Media Petition are therefore addressed herein by confirming that the TCPA does
not require a party transmitting a text message to create or make available to consumers a specific or particular
method (such as bilateral text messaging) by which a consumer may revoke prior express consent. In addition, we
further codify the sender’s obligations when the text initiator chooses not to use a text protocol that allows for reply
texts. As a result, we dismiss this petition as moot because we have essentially resolved any uncertainty or
controversies raised in that petition pursuant to the rules adopted herein.
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15. We disagree with commenters who argue that callers should be allowed to designate the
specific means to permit consumers to revoke consent and that revocation requests must be directed only
to those designated methods.
32
We therefore codify a prohibition to that end. In the 2015 TCPA
Declaratory Ruling, the Commission rejected an identical request, concluding that a “consumer may
revoke his or her consent in any reasonable manner that clearly expresses his or her desire not to receive
further calls, and that the consumer is not limited to using only a revocation method that the caller has
established as one that it will accept.”
33
Allowing callers to limit revocation requests only to the specific
means that they have designated potentially places a significant obstacle in the way of consumers who no
longer wish to receive such calls by limiting the methods available to revoke consent, which is
inconsistent with the consumer privacy protections afforded under the TCPA.
34
In addition, the
clarifications set forth herein ensure that consumers have the ability to easily exercise their right to revoke
consent while providing callers with a reasonable opportunity to process such requests made in any
reasonable way. For example, as discussed below, when the consumer chooses to use a method that has
not been designated by the caller to process revocation requests, the caller will have an opportunity to
prove why the method used is not reasonable.
16. We also codify that, when a consumer uses a method other than those discussed above to
revoke consent, such as those made by voicemail or email to any telephone number or address at which
the consumer can reasonably expect to reach the caller but which has not been designated by the caller as
a method to revoke consent, doing so creates a rebuttable presumption that the consumer has revoked
consent when the called party satisfies their obligation to produce evidence that such a request has been
made, absent evidence to the contrary. We stress that, in the event of a dispute, the consumer must
identify to the finder of fact the specific method and/or message used to convey their revocation of
consent in order to avail themselves of this rebuttable presumption. As discussed above, in these
instances when a consumer has demonstrated that they have made a revocation request, and the caller
disputes that the revocation request has been made using a reasonable method, a totality of circumstances
analysis will determine whether the caller can demonstrate that a request to revoke consent has not been
conveyed in a reasonable manner.
35
We disagree with commenters who argue this approach is
inconsistent with consumers’ right to revoke by any reasonable means.
36
Our approach is a means to
ascertain whether a consumer has used a reasonable method to revoke consent when the consumer has
used a method of their own choosing rather than one established by the calling or texting entity.
17. Lastly, we note that section 64.1200(c)(2) requires that callers not make “telephone
solicitations” to telephone numbers registered on the National Do-Not-Call Registry unless the caller has
32
See, e.g. NTCA Comments at 2-3; SFCU Comments at 1; REACH Reply Comments at 4-5.
33
See 2015 TCPA Declaratory Ruling, 30 FCC Rcd at 7996-99, paras. 64-70. Some parties argue that consumers
and callers should be free to negotiate their own terms for revocation. See, e.g., ABA Comments at 10; ACA
Comments at 14. These parties do not, however, provide analysis about the intersection of the TCPA and contract
law. Moreover, courts are well-equipped to apply the relevant body of contract law that may arise in TCPA
litigation.
34
Id. at 7997, para. 67. For example, if a caller receives a consumer’s valid oral consent for certain messages but
requires the consumer to fax his or her revocation to the caller, perhaps with additional conditions as to the content
of such a revocation, such conditions materially diminish the consumer’s ability to revoke by imposing additional
burdens—especially if disclosure of such conditions is not clear and conspicuous, and not repeated to the consumer
with each message.
35
See, e.g., ABA Comments at 13 (arguing that the use of “non-standard text” message such as “I do not want to
receive any more texts” is not a reasonable means to revoke consent because it cannot be read by automated
processes). We believe this addresses the concerns expressed by commenters that certain methods to request
revocation of consent are unreasonable.
36
See NCLC et al. Reply Comments at 5-8.
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obtained the “prior express invitation or permission” of the called party, in writing.
37
At the request of
one commenter, we take this opportunity to clarify and amend our rules to make clear that consumers who
have given their “prior express invitation or permission” to individual sellers to call their telephone
numbers on the National Do-Not-Call registry have the right to revoke consent by any reasonable
means.
38
We agree that the Commission’s precedent confirming the right of consumers to revoke consent
to robocalls applies equally to this situation.
18. Our rules are consistent with the Commission’s prior finding that placing significant
burdens on the called party who no longer wishes to receive such calls or texts is inconsistent with the
TCPA and with our finding that the TCPA requires “only that the called party clearly express his or her
desire not to receive further calls” to invoke this right to revoke consent.
39
B. Timeframe for Honoring a Do-Not-Call or Revocation Request
19. As proposed in the TCPA Consent NPRM, we require that callers honor company-
specific do-not-call and revocation-of-consent requests for robocalls and robotexts that are subject to the
TCPA within a specific timeframe. Specifically, we amend our rules to require that callers honor
company-specific do-not-call and revocation-of-consent requests within a reasonable time from the date
that the request is made, not to exceed 10 business days after receipt of the request.
40
20. Consumers are understandably frustrated when they receive robocalls and robotext
messages days or even weeks following a request to stop such communications. Such delays also
undermine a consumer’s right to determine which robocalls and robotexts they wish to receive under the
privacy protections afforded by the TCPA. In addition, advances in technology over the years, including
automated and interactive technologies, have made the processing of do-not-call and consent-revocation
requests more efficient and timely than in the past.
41
As discussed in more detail below, we believe that
such technological advances provide callers and senders of text messages with the tools they need to
process all do-not-call and consent-revocation requests quickly, and certainly within 10 business days.
We will monitor compliance with this obligation to ensure that such requests are honored in a timely
manner and reserve the right to adjust this timeframe as necessary in the future as technologies continue
to advance, and thereby further reduce the time necessary to process such requests after notice and
comment.
21. We revise our proposed 24-hour timeframe in response to commenter concerns that the
proposed 24-hour timeframe would not be feasible in many instances.
42
We are persuaded by the record,
including comments from consumer organizations, that a longer timeframe is justified to ensure that
entities, including smaller entities, have a reasonable opportunity to process do-not-call and revocation
requests.
43
The timeframe we adopt is supported by several commenters and is consistent with the
timeframe that has been in place for decades to process revocation requests concerning commercial e-mail
37
See 47 CFR § 64.1200(c)(2)(ii).
38
See NCLC et al. Comments at 15.
39
See 2015 TCPA Declaratory Ruling, 30 FCC Rcd at 7997, para. 67.
40
We encourage callers to honor such requests as soon as practicable as a best practice.
41
See, e.g., Shields Comments at 1; PACE Comments at 7; Williams Comments at 1; ZipDX Comments at 5.
42
See, e.g., ABA Comments at 16 (requesting six business days to process revocation requests); ACA Comments at
16 (10 business days); EEI Comments at 15 (10 business days): NAMIC Comments at 3 (not to exceed 14 business
days); NTCA et al. Comments at 5 (72 hours); PACE Comments at 7 (five business days): UHG Comments at 3 (14
days).
43
See, e.g., ACA Comments at 16 (noting that the CAN-SPAM rules allow 10 business days to honor revocation
requests); NCLC et al. Reply Comments at 4 (recommending that the Commission allow a longer period for the first
year after the regulation goes into effect—perhaps as long as 14 days, but then require that callers figure out how to
adopt an implementation period of two business days after the revocation request is made).
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under our CAN-SPAM rules.
44
We believe this outcome adequately balances the burdens on callers with
the privacy protections afforded to consumers, with a “no longer than 10 business days” backstop to
ensure that consumers have certainty about when they can expect unwanted communications to stop.
22. The Commission’s rules currently provide no specific timeframe for honoring revocation-
of-consent requests for robocalls and robotexts made to residential or wireless telephone numbers. The
Commission’s rules currently require callers making telemarketing calls or exempted artificial and
prerecorded voice calls to residential telephone numbers and exempted package delivery calls and texts to
wireless consumers to honor do-not-call requests within a reasonable time not to exceed 30 days from the
date of any such request.
45
As a result, the timeframe adopted herein substantially reduces the maximum
period allowed for honoring the revocation requests of consumers while allowing callers a reasonable
opportunity to ensure that they can process requests made by any reasonable means. We emphasize that
the availability of automated means to process revocation requests means that honoring such requests
should be swift, especially as technology improves to make automation more simple and economical. We
will continue to monitor these advances to ensure that consumers receive the full benefits of these
technologies.
23. As proposed in the TCPA Consent NPRM, we also amend our rules for exempted
package delivery calls to substantially reduce the 30-day timeframe to process such requests allowed in
our current rules.
46
Specifically, we amend the exemption that allows package delivery notification
robocalls and robotexts without consent to require that opt-out requests be honored within a reasonable
time not to exceed six business days.
47
The record suggests that this timeframe is sufficient to ensure
processing of revocation requests in this specific context.
48
No commenter argues for any other
timeframe in this context or objects to this timeframe. As a result, we believe this will provide consumers
with certainty that their requests are honored in a more timely manner while allowing package delivery
companies a reasonable opportunity to process such requests.
C. Revocation Confirmation Text Message
1. Confirmation of Revocation Request
24. As proposed in the TCPA Consent NPRM, we codify the Commission’s Soundbite
Declaratory Ruling which clarified that a one-time text message confirming a consumer’s request that no
further text messages be sent does not violate the TCPA or the Commission’s rules as long as the
confirmation text merely confirms the called party’s opt-out request and does not include any marketing
or promotional information, and the text is the only additional message sent to the called party after
receipt of the opt-out request.
49
Consistent with the Soundbite Declaratory Ruling, if the confirmation
text is sent within five minutes of receipt, it will be presumed to fall within the consumer’s prior express
44
See, e.g., ACA Comments at 16; EEI Comments at 15; REACH Reply Comments at 1; see also 47 CFR
64.3100(b)(1). In some instances, commenters suggested that revocation requests could be honored in even a
shorter timeframe. See ABA Comments (six business days); NTCA Comments at 5 (three days); PACE Comments
at 7 (five days).
45
See 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(9)(i), (d)(3).
46
See 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(9)(i)(F).
47
See 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(9)(i).
48
See, e.g., Cargo Comments at 6 (noting that many package delivery companies must coordinate their deliveries
with vendors and suggesting that a six-business-day timeframe allows for a reasonable amount of time).
49
See Soundbite Declaratory Ruling, 27 FCC Rcd at 15394-98, paras. 7-12 (noting that the sending of such
confirmation text messages is a widespread practice that often benefits consumers).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
9
consent.
50
If it takes longer, however, the sender will have to make a showing that such delay was
reasonable, and the longer this delay, the more difficult it will be to demonstrate that such a message falls
within the original prior consent.
51
In the Soundbite Declaratory Ruling, the Commission determined that
“confirmation messages ultimately benefit and protect consumers by helping to ensure, via such
confirmation, that the consumer who ostensibly opted out in fact no longer wishes to receive text
messages from entities from whom the consumer previously expressed an affirmative desire to receive
such messages.”
52
We agree with numerous commenters that codifying this ruling will better ensure that
both text senders and recipients are aware of this ruling, including the limitations on such one-time
confirmation text messages.
53
25. We also adopt our proposal to codify that senders can include a request for clarification
in this one-time confirmation text, provided the sender ceases all further robocalls and robotexts absent an
affirmative response from the consumer.
54
We limit this opportunity to request clarification to instances
where the text recipient has consented to several categories of text messages from the text sender. Thus,
this rule will give consumers an opportunity to specify which types of text messages they wish to no
longer get, when the texter sends different types of messages. That request for clarification can seek
confirmation that the consumer wishes to opt out of all categories of messages from the sender, provided
the sender ceases all further robocalls and robotexts absent an affirmative response from the consumer
that they do, in fact, wish to receive further communications from the sender. The lack of any response to
the confirmation text must be treated by the sender as a revocation of consent for all robocalls and
robotexts from the sender.
55
26. We adopt this proposal in response to Capital One’s petition seeking confirmation that
the text sender may request clarification in its one-time confirmation message of the scope of the
recipient’s revocation request when that recipient has consented to receiving multiple categories of
informational messages from the sender.
56
Banks and financial institutions support this request,
indicating that consumers often consent to receive multiple categories of informational messages, such as
50
Id. at 15397 at para. 11 (noting that the record in that proceeding reflects that such confirmation text messages can
be sent within minutes of receipt of an opt-out request). As discussed above, we amend our rules to require that
company-specific do-not-call and revocation-of-consent requests must be honored within a reasonable time and no
more than 10 business days after receipt of the request. This timeframe begins upon receipt of the revocation
request and not the sending of the confirmation text message. Thus, any delay in sending the confirmation text
would not result in any additional time to honor revocation requests.
51
We note that when compliance with a specific legal requirement prohibits the sending of a confirmation text
message within five minutes that this constitutes a sufficient showing that any such delay is reasonable. Any such
delay should not extend beyond the scope of the underlying prohibition on sending the text message. See, e.g.,
Letter from Leah Dempsey et al., Counsel for ACA International to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC, dated Feb. 7,
2024 at 8 (contending that statutes such as the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act restrict the ability of debt
collectors to send messages during certain hours of the day) (ACA et al. ex parte).
52
Soundbite Declaratory Ruling, 27 FCC Rcd at 15396, para. 10.
53
See, e.g., Ad Hoc Comments at 3; EEI Comments at 16; Illinois Credit Comments at 2; NCLC et al. Comments at
3; PACE Comments at 8; ZipDx Comments at 5.
54
The issues raised in the Capital One Petition are therefore addressed herein by codifying that, if a consumer who
has consented to receive multiple types of informational messages from a sender then revokes consent, the sender
can inform the consumer of the scope of the revocation in a one-time message without violating the TCPA. As a
result, we dismiss this petition as moot because we have essentially resolved any uncertainty or controversies raised
in that petition pursuant to the rules adopted herein.
55
We emphasize that our amended rules require that callers honor company-specific do-not-call and revocation-of-
consent requests within a reasonable time and no more than 10 business days after receipt of the request. The
timing of the confirmation text does not impact the obligation to honor the revocation within this timeframe.
56
See Capital One Petition at 7.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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fraud alerts, payment notices, and declined card transactions.
57
In these situations, opt-out requests can be
ambiguous as to whether the request applies to all or just certain types of those messages.
58
Consumer
groups have also expressed support for Capital One’s request, provided that a lack of any response to the
confirmation text message must be interpreted by the sender to mean that the consumer’s revocation
request was intended to encompass all categories of robocalls and robotexts and the sender must therefore
cease all further robocalls and robotexts to that consumer absent further clarification from the consumer.
59
27. Consistent with the Soundbite Declaratory Ruling and Capital One’s request, we codify
that any such clarification message must not contain any marketing or advertising content or seek to
persuade the recipient to reconsider their opt-out decision.
60
Rather, this clarification is strictly limited to
informing the recipient of the broad scope of the opt-out request absent some further confirmation from
the consumer that they wish to continue receiving certain categories of text messages from the sender.
28. We emphasize that this confirmation text message is limited to a final one-time text
message. In the absence of an affirmative response from the consumer that they wish to continue to
receive certain categories of informational calls or text messages from the sender, no further robocalls or
robotexts for which consent is required can be made to this consumer.
61
In addition, a “STOP” or similar
text sent in response to the one-time request for confirmation does not then allow the text sender to send
another request for further clarification. As noted above, both industry and consumer groups support this
proposal.
62
2. Scope of Consent Revocation
29. We clarify that any revocation of consent request applies only to those robocalls and
robotexts for which consent is required under the TCPA. Once that consent is revoked, the caller may no
longer make robocalls or send robotexts to a called party absent an exemption to the consent obligation.
However, the Commission has granted exemptions from the consent requirement for certain categories of
robocalls and robotexts.
63
In these situations, consent is not required for the caller to make or send certain
exempted informational robocalls or robotexts. Instead, the caller is required to comply with specific
conditions including number and frequency limits of such communications; the caller must also stop such
communications only if the consumer makes a request to opt out of the exempted communications.
30. As a result, the rule that we codify here that requires callers to honor a revocation of
consent request made by any reasonable means applies only to robocalls and robotexts that the called
party has consented to receive and is separate from the ability of callers to make such informational
communications pursuant to an exemption, which do not require consent. Therefore, in effect, when a
consumer revokes consent with regard to telemarketing robocalls or robotexts, the caller can continue to
reach the consumer pursuant to an exempted informational call, which does not require consent, unless
and until the consumer separately expresses an intent to opt out of these exempted calls. Where the
consumer has revoked consent in response to a telemarketing call or message, it remains unclear whether
57
For example, Capital One notes that, if it were to send a text message about a declined card transaction to which
the recipient responded with “stop,” it would be unclear whether the customer is requesting to opt out of all
messages including payment due notices and suspected fraud alerts, or only card decline notices. See Capital One
Petition at 3.
58
See, e.g., ACA Comments at 1-2; National Association of Federally-Insured Credit Unions at 1-2.
59
See Consumer Reports Comments at 2; NCLC et al. Comments at 2.
60
Soundbite Declaratory Ruling, 27 FCC Rcd at 15397, paras. 11-12; Capital One Petition at 2.
61
Such consent does not necessarily have to be obtained in response to the confirmation text but can be obtained
through other means that satisfy the obligations of the TCPA and Commission rules.
62
See, e.g., Ad Hoc Comments at 4; EEI Comments at 17; Illinois Credit Comments at 2; Capital One Reply
Comments at 1-2.
63
See 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(3), (a)(9).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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the consumer has expressed an intent to opt out of otherwise exempted informational calls absent some
indication to the contrary.
64
We agree with financial institutions’ concerns that consumers may
inadvertently opt out of exempted informational calls or messages such as fraud alerts when attempting to
stop unwanted telemarketing calls from their bank.
65
If the revocation request is made directly in
response to an exempted informational call or text, however, this constitutes an opt-out request from the
consumer and all further non-emergency robocalls and robotexts must stop. In these circumstances, there
is no ambiguity that the consumer’s intent is to no longer receive such exempted informational calls from
the caller: the opt-out request is a communication from the consumer regarding the exempted
informational calls and acts as a revocation of consent for all calls from the caller.
31. We disagree with commenters that argue the Commission should carve out specific
subcategories of informational messages such as fraud alerts, identity theft, and breach notifications and
force consumers to revoke consent to these specific categories of informational messages even when the
caller chooses not to comply with the conditions of an underlying exemption for such informational
messages.
66
We believe this would be burdensome to consumers and unnecessary given the ability of
callers to comply with the conditions of an exemption to make such communications in the absence of
having consent and the ability to send a confirmation text informing consumers of the scope of their
revocation request affording them an opportunity to provide consent for any type of calls or messages that
they wish to continue receiving from the caller.
32. Lastly, we take this opportunity to confirm that, when consent is revoked in any
reasonable manner, that revocation extends to both robocalls and robotexts regardless of the medium used
to communicate the revocation of consent.
67
For example, if the consumer revokes consent using a reply
text message, then consent is deemed revoked not only to further robotexts but also robocalls from that
caller. The TCPA requires that the caller obtain the prior express consent of the “called party.”
68
The
Commission has long held that the restriction encompasses both voice calls and texts.
69
Consent is
granted from a consumer to a calling party to be contacted at a particular wireless phone number or
residential line.
70
Revocation of consent, therefore, is an instruction that the caller no longer contact the
consumer at that number. As a result, consent is specific to the called party and not the method of
communication used to revoke consent. Thus, if a called party has revoked consent via any reasonable
means, the caller no longer has consent to make further robocalls or robotexts to that called party absent
instructions to the contrary from the consumer.
D. Legal Authority
33. We conclude that our legal authority for the rules adopted herein derives from section
227 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (the Act).
71
As discussed above, as the expert
64
For example, if the consumer makes clear in their response to a telemarketing call that they also do not wish to
receive any informational calls from the caller.
65
See, e.g., Letter from Michael H. Pryor, Counsel to ACA et al. to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CG Docket
No. 02-278 (filed Sept. 18, 2023) at 2 (arguing that “it is critical that businesses not be compelled to apply a
customer’s revocation request to a broader category of messages than the customer intends”).
66
See ACA et al. ex parte at 6-7.
67
See EEI Reply Comments at 7-8 (contending that, if a consumer revokes consent using a reply text, the revocation
should only apply to text messages).
68
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).
69
See, e.g., Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No.
02-278, Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 14014, 14115, para. 165 (2003).
70
See Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-
278, Report and Order, 27 FCC Rcd at 1838, para. 20.
71
See 47 U.S.C. § 227.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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agency on the TCPA, the Commission has addressed issues relating to prior express consent by robocall
consumers on numerous occasions.
72
E. Effective Date and Compliance Date
34. This Order will become effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register, except
that the amendments to sections 64.1200(a)(9)(i)(F) and 64.1200(d)(3), 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(9)(i)(F) and
(d)(3), and new sections 64.1200(a)(10), and 64.1200(a)(11), 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(10) and (a)(11), which
may contain new or modified information collection requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act
(PRA), will not be effective until six months following review by Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). We agree with several commenters that compliance with these rule changes necessitates an
extended period of time to ensure that affected parties can take measures to implement these changes.
73
Therefore, based on our review of the record and these considerations, we believe the appropriate
timeframe for implementation of these amended rules is six months following publication in the Federal
Register of notice that OMB has completed any required review of the adopted rules.
74
The Commission
will publish a notice in the Federal Register announcing the effective date for such rules and issue a
Public Notice once that date has been established.
IV. FURTHER NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING
A. Wireless Provider Exemption
35. We seek comment on whether the TCPA applies to robocalls and robotexts from wireless
providers to their own subscribers and therefore such providers must have consent to make prerecorded
voice, artificial voice, or autodialed calls or texts to their own subscribers. We seek comment on whether
wireless providers satisfy any TCPA consent obligation pursuant to the unique nature of the relationship
and service that they provide to their subscribers.
75
Specifically, we ask whether wireless providers
require additional consent beyond that provided by the unique nature of this relationship with their
subscribers to satisfy this requirement. To the extent that wireless providers have consent to robocall or
robotext their own subscribers, we propose that wireless subscribers, as any other called party, be able to
revoke such consent by communicating a revocation of consent request to their wireless provider and that
such request must be honored. We seek comment on these issues as set forth in more detail below.
76
36. In the 2023 TCPA Consent NPRM, we proposed to require wireless providers to honor
their customers’ requests to cease robocalls and robotexts.
77
To effectuate this result, we proposed at that
time to create and codify a qualified exemption—based on our authority under section 227(b)(2)(C)—for
informational robocalls and robotexts from wireless providers to their subscribers, subject to certain
conditions including honoring requests to opt out of such communications.
78
In response to requests for
comments on this proposal, wireless providers suggest that the TCPA’s prohibitions do not apply to
72
As noted, the TCPA does not define the term “prior express consent.”
73
See, e.g., ABA Comments at 17 (should allow 18 months); ACA Comments (rules should become effective 18
months after publication in the Federal Register); EEI Comments at 17; UHG Comments (requesting 12 months
after publication); NCLC et al. Reply Comments at 5 (arguing that a six-month compliance period is likely to result
in more efficient implementation).
74
We note that the implementation period will be longer than six months because of the additional time required for
OMB to approve the information collections associated with the new rules. As a result, the actual timeframe before
the rules adopted herein become effective will be consistent with the longer timeframes recommended by some
commenters.
75
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).
76
We note that this proposal differs from that contained in the TCPA Consent NPRM.
77
See TCPA Consent NPRM at paras. 21-26.
78
Id.
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communications from wireless providers to their subscribers because there is no charge to the subscriber
and they have a unique relationship with their subscribers.
79
In light of these arguments, we now revisit
that proposal.
37. We now seek further comment on the argument that, pursuant to the 1992 TCPA Order or
statutory language, wireless providers are wholly excluded from the application of the TCPA’s
requirement to obtain consent before robocalling or robotexting their own subscribers because there is no
charge imposed on the subscriber.
80
In 1992, the Commission concluded that wireless carriers need not
obtain “additional consent” prior to initiating autodialed, artificial voice, or prerecorded voice calls to
their own subscribers.
81
Although it stated that such robocalls could be made by wireless providers to
their own subscribers without a charge, the Commission did not specify whether it intended to wholly
exclude wireless providers from the statutory obligation to obtain consent based solely on the calls being
free to the called party.
82
Moreover, shortly following this ruling Congress amended the TCPA to grant
the Commission express statutory authority to exempt from the prior-express-consent requirement calls to
wireless numbers that are not charged to the called party subject to such conditions as the Commission
deems necessary to protect the privacy rights afforded under the TCPA.
83
Section 227(b)(2)(C)’s
authority to grant exemptions from the prior-express-consent requirement is predicated on the ability of
callers to make such calls with no charge to the consumer.
84
We believe Congress could not have meant
the pre-amended TCPA to exempt free calls from the consent requirement because its amendment
describes exactly how the Commission must go about that, including an analysis of each type of
exempted call and an affirmative showing that such an exemption does not unduly harm consumer
privacy.
38. Similarly, we are not persuaded that the pre-amended TCPA itself exempts robocalls to
wireless subscribers for which there is no charge. The TCPA prohibits robocalls absent an emergency
purpose or with the prior express consent of the called party “to any telephone number assigned to a
paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier
service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call.”
85
As the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit explained in interpreting this provision: “[t]he rule of the last antecedent requires the
phrase ‘for which the called party is charged for the call,’ [in section 227(b)(1)], ‘to be applied to the
words or phrase immediately preceding (i.e. “any service”), and not to be construed as extending to or
79
See, e.g., AT&T Comments at 1-6; CTIA Comments at 3-4; NLA Comments at 2-3; Verizon Comments at 1-7.
80
See, e.g., AT&T Comments at 1-2; CTIA Comments at 10; Verizon Comments at 14-17 (“The 1992 Commission
correctly recognized that wireless carriers do not need to ‘obtain additional consent’ to communicate with their
customers for free – the only consent required is that intrinsic to the relationship between common carriers and their
customers.”).
81
See 1992 TCPA Order, 7 FCC Rcd at 8774, para. 45.
82
The Commission has made reference to the 1992 TCPA Order’s ruling on wireless providers on other occasions
without making changes to that ruling, but shed no further light on the underlying basis for that decision. For
example, in 2020, the Commission was tasked with reviewing the exemptions granted under section 227(b)(2)(B) or
(C) to ensure that they included certain conditions. In so doing, the Commission noted that, because the 1992 TCPA
Order’s ruling on wireless providers was not taken pursuant to section 227(b)(2)(B) or (C), it did not fall within the
scope of the 2020 undertaking. See Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report and Order, 35 FCC Rcd 15188 at 15204, para. 50 (2020).
83
See Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 102-556, 106 Stat 4181 (1992); 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(2)(C).
84
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(C). Specifically, section 227(b)(2)(C) provides that the Commission “may, by rule or
order, exempt from the requirements of paragraph (1)(A)(iii) of this subsection calls to a telephone number assigned
to a cellular telephone service that are not charged to the called party, subject to such conditions as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary in the interest of the privacy rights this section is intended to protect” (emphasis added).
85
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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including others more remote.”
86
As the court concluded “[i]f the phrase ‘any service for which the called
party is charged for the call’ requires that the party be charged per call for the ‘paging service, cellular
telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service’ in order for
the party to prohibit autodialed calls, then the listing of these services would be superfluous because they
are already included under the term ‘any service for which the called party is charged.’”
87
Another
federal circuit court decision has reached the same conclusion.
88
39. This interpretation of the relevant statutory provision is consistent with the Commission’s
own treatment of robocalls to wireless numbers for which there is no charge to the called party. For
example, the Commission has allowed certain specific categories of robocalls to wireless telephone
numbers that can be made without a charge to the called party only when they have been granted an
exemption from the TCPA’s consent obligation.
89
We, therefore, seek comment on the contention that
either the 1992 TCPA Order or the TCPA itself wholly excludes wireless providers from the TCPA’s
consent requirement when communicating with their own subscribers solely because their calls and texts
are free to their subscribers.
90
Rather, read in light of the subsequent statutory amendment, we believe the
1992 TCPA Order’s reference to the ability of wireless providers to communicate with their subscribers
without imposing any charge on those subscribers is an example of the unique nature of the wireless
provider and subscriber relationship that supported the Commission’s conclusion that such providers need
not obtain “additional consent” under the TCPA to robocall their own subscribers. We seek comment on
this analysis.
40. Having proposed to confirm that wireless providers are subject to the TCPA when
communicating with their subscribers, we seek comment on whether wireless providers have effectively
obtained consent to make robocalls and send robotexts to their own subscribers by virtue of their unique
relationship with their subscribers. Several wireless providers citing the 1992 TCPA Order contend that
an inherent unique relationship renders it unnecessary to obtain any additional form of consent to
communicate with their own subscribers.
91
41. Wireless providers are in a unique position to accurately obtain, track, and maintain
records of their subscribers’ activities, including prepaid subscribers, to ensure that they are sent critical,
time-sensitive information to avoid inadvertently losing their wireless service or experiencing bill shock
from overages or roaming fees.
92
The Commission has acknowledged the benefit of these
communications and has encouraged wireless providers to send them to their wireless subscribers.
93
In
86
See Osorio v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242, 1257 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We therefore presume that
Congress did not intend the phrase ‘for which the called party is charged for the call’ to apply to cellular telephone
services”).
87
Id. at 1258.
88
See Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 349 (3d Cir. 2017) (“If it were the case (as WOW suggests)
that cell phone calls not charged to the recipient were not covered by the general prohibition, there would have been
no need for Congress to grant the FCC discretion to exempt some of those calls.”).
89
See, e.g., Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No.
02-278, Order, 29 FCC Rcd 3432, 3437-38, para. 19 (2014) (exempting package delivery calls to wireless
consumers that are not charged to the called party).
90
See, e.g., CTIA Comments at 10; Verizon Comments at 7.
91
See, e.g., AT&T Comments at 1-2; CTIA Comments at 3; Verizon Comments at 1. See also NCLC Comments at
2 (suggesting that wireless providers have consent for these calls and texts by virtue of the contracts with their
customers).
92
See, e.g., CTIA Comments at 2-4.
93
See, e.g., Empowering Consumers to Avoid Bill Shock; Consumer Information and Disclosure, CC Docket Nos.
09-158, 10-207, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 25 FCC Rcd 14625 (2010) (concluding that it would be beneficial
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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some instances, the Commission’s rules require these communications so that, for example, low-income
consumers do not inadvertently lose benefits that make their service affordable.
94
The ability to provide
such information is a unique function of the wireless provider and subscriber relationship that advances
the interests of consumers by ensuring they are informed of any potential risk to the ongoing provision of
their wireless service. As a result, we agree that wireless providers have a unique relationship that allows
them to send critical information to their subscribers that their subscribers may welcome.
95
In addition,
wireless providers are in a unique position in that they offer the specific service over which these
communications are made, including the provision of the unique telephone number at which subscribers
are contacted over that service. We seek comment on whether the nature of this unique relationship and
service continues to render it unnecessary for wireless providers to obtain any additional consent from
their subscribers, as the Commission concluded in the 1992 TCPA Order. We seek comment on whether
that view is incorrect, e.g., because the TCPA requires a more affirmative statement from a consumer that
they consent to robocalls. Parties arguing for this conclusion should state whether such a view could
upset the status quo such that millions of subscribers who may currently receive robocalls and robotexts
they welcome from their providers would no longer be able to receive them unless they take steps to
consent. And, if so, we seek comment on how we should proceed to avoid inadvertently disrupting the
flow of information that wireless subscribers have come to expect or burdening wireless providers with
the necessity of obtaining such consent from their existing subscribers.
96
42. Should the Commission determine that wireless providers are required to obtain consent
and have effectively obtained consent to make robocalls and send robotexts to their own subscribers by
virtue of their unique relationship with their subscribers, we seek comment on whether this consent
should extend to robocalls and robotexts that contain telemarketing or advertisements. In 2012, the
Commission adopted rules requiring prior express consent to be obtained in writing for autodialed or
prerecorded telemarketing calls to wireless numbers.
97
In so doing, however, the Commission has not
extended this requirement to robocalls made by a wireless provider to their own subscribers.
98
As a
result, we seek comment on whether we should revisit this issue to require prior express written consent
to be obtained for any such robocall or robotext that contains telemarketing or advertising.
43. We seek comment on whether the right to revoke consent extends to wireless subscribers
when they receive unwanted robocalls and robotexts from their wireless provider, just as it does to any
robocalls or texts sent pursuant to the TCPA.
99
As a result, we seek comment on whether wireless
providers must honor any revocation or opt-out requests from their own subscribers that are made through
any reasonable means and at any time. We seek comment on whether, if we were to find wireless
providers have consent based on having a unique relationship with their subscribers, we should codify a
new rule to that effect that would make clear consumers also have a right to revoke consent to such
for consumers to receive usage alerts from their wireless providers and proposing rules that would require wireless
providers to provide usage alerts for overages and international or roaming charges).
94
See, e.g., NLA Comments at 2-3 (noting the Commission’s rules that obligate providers to communicate with
subscribers regarding de-enrollment in the Lifeline and ACP programs); Verizon Comments at 4-5.
95
See, e.g., AT&T Comments at 4-6; NLA Comments at 2-3; Verizon Comments at 4-6.
96
In seeking comment on these issues, we do not intend to disturb current or past wireless provider practices
regarding making robocalls and sending robotexts to their subscribers. We anticipate that any action the
Commission may take in the future will be prospective and will not impact providers’ current calling behavior.
97
See Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-
278, Report and Order, 27 FCC Rcd 1830, 1837, para. 20 (2012); 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(2).
98
Id. at 1840-41, para. 27.
99
See 2015 TCPA Declaratory Ruling, 30 FCC Rcd at 7993-99, paras. 55-70 (confirming that consumers who have
provided consent to receive autodialed or prerecorded calls may revoke such consent through any reasonable
means).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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communications. Although many of the messages sent by wireless providers to their own subscribers
may be welcome and provide useful information, as wireless commenters suggest, we do not believe there
is any reason to deprive wireless subscribers of the same right to exercise revocation of consent when
they make an affirmative request not to receive such communications. In this circumstance, the
subscriber has made clear that they do not wish to receive such further communications from their
wireless provider regardless of the merits of the robocalls and robotexts that they receive.
100
The record in
this matter confirms that at least some wireless subscribers do not wish to receive these communications
from their wireless provider.
101
44. We do not believe that any obligation to honor revocation requests is unduly burdensome
to wireless providers. In fact, the record suggests that some wireless providers already honor opt-out
requests on many communications to subscribers.
102
Other callers have implemented such measures for
decades to comply with our rules. Nevertheless, we seek comment on ways to reduce any new burdens
such a requirement might entail, including for smaller wireless providers. We seek comment on this
proposal and any other issues commenters may wish to raise in this context, including any alternative
proposals set forth in the TCPA Consent NPRM that would allow us to balance consumer privacy rights
without unduly interfering with the ability of wireless providers to communicate critical information to
their subscribers.
B. Expanding Opt-Out Requirements
45. We seek comment on NCLC’s request that the Commission amend section 64.1200(b)(3)
of our rules to require an automated opt-out mechanism on every call that contains an artificial or
prerecorded voice.
103
NCLC argues that consumers “complain about the seemingly unstoppable”
prerecorded non-marketing calls from entities such as medical professionals and, in NCLC’s view, that
would harmonize the treatment of such calls with those to residential lines.
104
We seek comment on this
proposal, including whether such a change is necessary and what the compliance costs of such a change
would be on callers including any alternatives that would minimize compliance burdens on smaller
entities.
105
V. PROCEDURAL MATTERS
46. Paperwork Reduction Act. This document may contain new or modified information
collection requirements subject to PRA, Public Law 104-13. All such new or modified information
collection requirements will be submitted to OMB for review under § 3507(d) of the PRA. OMB, the
general public, and other Federal agencies will be invited to comment on any new or modified
information collection requirements contained in this proceeding. In addition, we note that pursuant to
the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(4), we
previously sought specific comment on how the Commission might further reduce the information
100
As discussed above, wireless providers will have the opportunity to send one last confirmation text to their
subscriber informing the recipient of the scope of the opt-out request absent some further confirmation from the
consumer that they wish to continue receiving certain categories of text messages from the sender. This will provide
subscribers an opportunity to make clear whether they wish to receive certain types of robocalls and robotexts from
their provider.
101
See, e.g., Williams Comments (“[u]nwanted communication is unwanted communication, no matter the source”);
Armbruster Petition; Cranor Petition.
102
See Verizon Comments at 10.
103
See Letter from Margot Saunders, Senior Counsel, NCLC, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, filed in CG
Docket 02-278 (dated Feb. 5, 2024) [emphasis added]; NCLC et al. Reply Comments at 3.
104
See id.
105
Our current rules mandate the use of automated, interactive opt-out mechanisms only in certain specific
instances. See 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(9), (b)(3).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees, and we received no
comments.
47. In this present document, we have assessed the effects of the rules adopted herein that
may impose collection burdens on small business concerns to implement measures to process revocation
of consent requests to robocall or robotext consumers. We find that, to the extent these requirements
constitute an information collection, such collection will not present a substantial burden for small
business concerns with fewer than 25 employees and that any such burdens are outweighed by the
benefits to consumers in affording them protections from unwanted calls and text messages.
48. Regulatory Flexibility Act. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended,
(RFA),
106
requires that an agency prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis for notice and comment
rulemakings, unless the agency certifies that “the rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.”
107
Accordingly, we have prepared a Final
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) concerning the possible impact of the rule changes contained in
this Order on small entities. The FRFA is set forth in Appendix B.
49. We have also prepared an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) concerning the
potential impact of the rule and policy changes contained in the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
The IRFA is set forth in Appendix C. Written public comments are requested on the IRFA. Comments
must be filed by the deadlines for comments on the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking indicated on
the first page of this document and must have a separate and distinct heading designating them as
responses to the IRFA.
50. Congressional Review Act. The Commission has determined, and the Administrator of
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB concurs, that these rules are “non-major” under
the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. § 804(2). The Commission will send a copy of this Report and
Order to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).
51. Ex Parte Rules. The proceeding shall be treated as a “permit-but-disclose” proceeding in
accordance with the Commission’s ex parte rules.
108
Persons making ex parte presentations must file a
copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two
business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies).
Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation
must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte
presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the
presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments
already reflected in the presenter’s written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the
presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or
other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be
found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission
staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent
with section 1.1206(b) of the Commission’s rules. In proceedings governed by section 1.49(f) of the
Commission’s rules or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing,
written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all
attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that
106
5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612. The RFA has been amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
of 1996 (SBREFA), Pub. L. No. 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 857 (1996).
107
5 U.S.C. § 605(b).
108
47 CFR §§ 1.1200 et seq.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in
this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission’s ex parte rules.
109
52. Filing of Comments and Reply Comments. Pursuant to sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the
Commission’s rules, 47 CFR §§ 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and reply comments
on or before the dates indicated on the first page of this document. Comments may be filed using the
Commission’s Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). See Electronic Filing of Documents in
Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1998).
• Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically using the Internet by accessing the
ECFS: www.fcc.gov/ecfs.
• Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and one copy of each
filing.
• Filings can be sent by commercial overnight courier, or by first-class or overnight U.S. Postal
Service mail. All filings must be addressed to the Commission’s Secretary, Office of the
Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
• Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service Express Mail and Priority Mail)
must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. U.S. Postal Service first
class, Express, and Priority mail must be addressed to 45 L Street NE, Washington, D.C. 20554.
• Effective March 19, 2020, and until further notice, the Commission no longer accepts any hand
or messenger delivered filings. This is a temporary measure taken to help protect the health and
safety of individuals, and to mitigate the transmission of COVID-19. See FCC Announces
Closure of FCC Headquarters Open Window and Change in Hand-Delivery Policy, Public
Notice, 35 FCC Rcd 2788 (OMD 2020).
53. People with Disabilities. To request materials in accessible formats for people with
disabilities (Braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to [email protected] or call
the Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice).
54. Availability of Documents. This Order will be available via ECFS. Documents will be
available electronically in ASCII, Microsoft Word, and/or Adobe Acrobat. These documents will also be
available for public inspection during regular business hours in the FCC Reference Center, Federal
Communications Commission, 45 L Street NE, Washington, D.C. 20554.
55. Additional Information. For additional information on this proceeding, contact Richard
D. Smith, [email protected] or (717) 338-2797, Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau,
Consumer Policy Division.
VI. ORDERING CLAUSES
56. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to section 227 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §227, that this Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking is hereby ADOPTED, and that Part 64 of the Commission’s rules, 47 CFR Part 64, is
amended as set forth in Appendix A.
57. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Report and Order SHALL BE EFFECTIVE 30
days after publication in the Federal Register, except that the amendments to sections 64.1200(a)(9)(i)(F)
and 64.1200(d)(3), and new sections 64.1200(a)(10), and 64.1200(a)(11), 47 CFR § 64.1200(a)(9)(i)(F),
(a)(10), (a)(11), and (d)(3), which may contain new or modified information collection requirements, will
not be required until six months after OMB completes review of any information collection requirements
that the Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau determines is required under the Paperwork
109
47 CFR § 1.49(f).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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Reduction Act. The Commission directs the Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau to announce
compliance dates by publication in the Federal Register and by subsequent Public Notice.
58. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition for Declaratory Ruling filed by Capital
One Services in CG Docket No. 02-278 on November 1, 2019, IS DISMISSED.
59. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition for Declaratory Ruling filed by Mobile
Media Technologies in CG Docket No. 02-278 on April 5, 2016, IS DISMISSED.
60. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commission SHALL SEND a copy of this
Order to Congress and to the Governmental Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review
Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).
61. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commission’s Office of Secretary SHALL
SEND a copy of this Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, including the Initial
and Final Regulatory Flexibility Analyses, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business
Administration.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Marlene H. Dortch
Secretary
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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APPENDIX A
Final Rules
For the reasons discussed above, the Federal Communications Commission amends 47 CFR part 64 as
follows:
PART 64 – MISCELLANEOUS RULES RELATING TO COMMON CARRIERS
1. The authority citation for part 64 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 154, 201, 202, 217, 218, 220, 222, 225, 226, 227, 227b, 228, 251(a),
251(e), 254(k), 255, 262, 276, 301, 316, 345, 403(b)(2)(B), (c), 616, 620, 716, 1401-1473, unless
otherwise noted; Div. P, Pub. L. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348, 1091; sec. 5, Pub. L. 117-223, 136 Stat 2280,
2285-88 (47 U.S.C 345 note).
2. Section 64.1200 is amended by revising paragraph (a)(9)(i)(F), adding paragraphs (a)(10)
through (12) and revising paragraph (d)(3) to read as follows:
Subpart L – Restrictions on Telemarketing, Telephone Solicitation, and Facsimile Advertising
§ 64.1200 Delivery Restrictions.
(a) * * *
(9) * * *
(i) * * *
(F) The package delivery company must offer package recipients the ability to
opt out of receiving future delivery notification calls and messages and must
honor an opt-out request within a reasonable time from the date such request is
made, not to exceed six business days; and,
* * * * *
(10) A called party may revoke prior express consent, including prior express written consent, to
receive calls or text messages made pursuant to paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) and (c)(2) of this
section by using any reasonable method to clearly express a desire not to receive further calls or
text messages from the caller or sender. Any revocation request made using an automated,
interactive voice or key press-activated opt-out mechanism on a call; using the words “stop,”
“quit,” “end,” “revoke,” “opt out,” “cancel,” or “unsubscribe” sent in reply to an incoming text
message; or pursuant to a website or telephone number designated by the caller to process opt-out
requests constitutes a reasonable means per se to revoke consent. If a called party uses any such
method to revoke consent, that consent is considered definitively revoked and the caller may not
send additional robocalls and robotexts. If a reply to an incoming text message uses words other
than “stop,” “quit,” “end,” “revoke,” “opt out,” “cancel,” or “unsubscribe,” the caller must treat
that reply text as a valid revocation request if a reasonable person would understand those words
to have conveyed a request to revoke consent. Should the text initiator choose to use a texting
protocol that does not allow reply texts, it must provide a clear and conspicuous disclosure on
each text to the consumer that two-way texting is not available due to technical limitations of the
texting protocol, and clearly and conspicuously provide on each text reasonable alternative ways
to revoke consent. All requests to revoke prior express consent or prior express written consent
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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made in any reasonable manner must be honored within a reasonable time not to exceed ten
business days from receipt of such request. Callers or senders of text messages covered by
paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) and (c)(2) of this section may not designate an exclusive means to
request revocation of consent.
(11) The use of any other means to revoke consent not listed in paragraph (a)(10), such as a
voicemail or email to any telephone number or email address intended to reach the caller, creates
a rebuttable presumption that the consumer has revoked consent when the called party satisfies
their obligation to produce evidence that such a request has been made, absent evidence to the
contrary. In those circumstances, a totality of circumstances analysis will determine whether the
caller can demonstrate that a request to revoke consent has not been conveyed in a reasonable
manner.
(12) A one-time text message confirming a request to revoke consent from receiving any further
calls or text messages does not violate paragraphs (a)(1) through (2) of this section as long as the
confirmation text merely confirms the text recipient’s revocation request and does not include any
marketing or promotional information, and is the only additional message sent to the called party
after receipt of the revocation request. If the confirmation text is sent within five minutes of
receipt, it will be presumed to fall within the consumer’s prior express consent. If it takes longer,
however, the sender will have to make a showing that such delay was reasonable. To the extent
that the text recipient has consented to several categories of text messages from the text sender,
the confirmation message may request clarification as to whether the revocation request was
meant to encompass all such messages; the sender must cease all further texts for which consent
is required absent further clarification that the recipient wishes to continue to receive certain text
messages.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(3) Recording, disclosure of do-not-call requests. If a person or entity making an artificial or
prerecorded-voice telephone call pursuant to an exemption under § 64.1200(a)(3)(ii) through (v)
or any call for telemarketing purposes (or on whose behalf such a call is made) receives a request
from a residential telephone subscriber not to receive calls from that person or entity, the person
or entity must record the request and place the subscriber's name, if provided, and telephone
number on the do-not-call list at the time the request is made. Persons or entities making such
calls (or on whose behalf such calls are made) must honor a residential subscriber’s do-not-call
request within a reasonable time from the date such request is made. This period may not exceed
ten (10) business days from the receipt of such request. If such requests are recorded or
maintained by a party other than the person or entity on whose behalf the call is made, the person
or entity on whose behalf the call is made will be liable for any failures to honor the do-not-call
request. A person or entity making an artificial or prerecorded-voice telephone call pursuant to
an exemption under § 64.1200(a)(3)(ii) through (v) or any call for telemarketing purposes must
obtain a consumer’s prior express permission to share or forward the consumer’s request not to be
called to a party other than the person or entity on whose behalf a call is made or an affiliated
entity.
* * * * *
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APPENDIX B
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
1. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA),
1
an Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was incorporated into the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, released in June 2023
(TCPA Consent NPRM).
2
The Federal Communications Commission (Commission) sought written
public comment on the proposals in the TCPA Consent NPRM, including comment on the IRFA. The
comments received are discussed below in Section B. This Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA)
conforms to the RFA.
3
A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Order
2. The Order clarifies and strengthens the right of consumers to grant or revoke consent to
receive robocalls and robotexts under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA).
4
Under
the TCPA, certain types of calls and texts may only be sent with the prior express consent of the called
party.
5
The ability of consumers to exercise this right to provide or revoke consent is essential to
protecting the privacy rights of consumers by allowing them to decide which callers may communicate
with them via robocalls and robotexts.
3. In addition, the Order codifies prior Commission rulings and adopts new requirements to
ensure that the requirements relating to providing or revoking consent under the TCPA are clear to both
callers and consumers. Specifically, the Order makes clear that consumers may revoke prior express
consent in any reasonable manner that clearly expresses a desire not to receive further calls or text
messages, including using an automated, interactive voice or key press-activated opt-out mechanism on a
call, using the words “stop,” “quit,” “end,” “revoke,” “opt out,” “cancel,” or “unsubscribe” sent in reply
to an incoming text message, or pursuant to a website designated by the caller to process opt-out requests.
These approaches constitute a reasonable means to revoke consent and that callers may not infringe on
that right by designating an exclusive means to revoke consent that precludes the use of any other
reasonable method.
4. The Order also requires that callers honor do-not-call and revocation requests in a
reasonable time not to exceed ten business days of receipt. Further, the Order reiterates that consumers
only need to revoke consent once to stop getting all calls and texts from a specific entity. It also codifies
that a one-time text message confirming a consumer’s request that no further text messages be sent does
not violate the TCPA or the Commission’s rules as long as the confirmation text merely confirms the
called party’s opt-out request, does not include any marketing or promotional information, and the text is
the only additional message sent to the called party after receipt of the opt-out request.
6
1
5 U.S.C. § 603. The RFA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612, was amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), Pub. L. 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 857 (1996).
2
See Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 23-49, Appx. B (June 9, 2023) (TCPA Consent NPRM).
3
5 U.S.C. § 604.
4
TCPA Consent NPRM at paras. 9-26; see also Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement
and Deterrence Act, Pub. L. No. 116-105, 133 Stat. 3274 (2019) (TRACED Act); TRACED Act § 8; Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (1991) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227)
(TCPA).
5
47 U.S.C. § 227(b).
6
See Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Soundbite
Communications, Inc., CG Docket No. 02-278, Declaratory Ruling, 27 FCC Rcd at 15391, paras. 7-12 (2012).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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B. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in Response to the IRFA
5. There were no comments filed that specifically addressed the rules and policies proposed
in the IRFA. Several commenter did, however, make reference to the potential compliance burdens
including the impact on small businesses. Commenters contend that compliance with an obligation to
honor revocation of consent requests within 24-hours would be burdensome for small entities.
7
We
address these concerns below in section F.
C. Response to Comments by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business
Administration
6. Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which amended the RFA, the
Commission is required to respond to any comments filed by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the
Small Business Administration (SBA), and to provide a detailed statement of any change made to the
proposed rules as a result of those comments.
8
The Chief Counsel did not file any comments in response
to the proposed rules in this proceeding.
D. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which the Rules Will
Apply
7. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where feasible, an estimate of
the number of small entities that may be affected by the rules adopted herein.
9
The RFA generally
defines the term “small entity” as having the same meaning as the terms “small business,” “small
organization,” and “small governmental jurisdiction.”
10
In addition, the term “small business” has the
same meaning as the term “small-business concern” under the Small Business Act.
11
A “small-business
concern” is one which: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of
operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the SBA.
12
8. Small Businesses, Small Organizations, Small Governmental Jurisdictions. Our actions,
over time, may affect small entities that are not easily categorized at present. We, therefore describe at
the outset, three broad groups of small entities that could be directly affected herein.
13
First, while there
are industry specific size standards for small businesses that are used in the regulatory flexibility analysis,
according to data from the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Office of Advocacy, in general a
small business is an independent business having fewer than 500 employees.
14
These types of small
businesses represent 99.9% of all businesses in the United States, which translates to 33.2 million
businesses.
15
7
See Illinois Credit Comments at 2; MEF Comments at 6; NAMIC Comments at 2-3; EEI Reply Comments at 6.
8
5 U.S.C. § 604(a)(3).
9
Id. § 604(a)(4).
10
Id. § 601(6).
11
Id. § 601(3) (incorporating by reference the definition of “small-business concern” in the Small Business Act, 15
U.S.C. § 632). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 601(3), the statutory definition of a small business applies “unless an agency,
after consultation with the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and after opportunity for public
comment, establishes one or more definitions of such term which are appropriate to the activities of the agency and
publishes such definition(s) in the Federal Register.”
12
15 U.S.C. § 632.
13
5 U.S.C. § 601(3)-(6).
14
See SBA, Office of Advocacy, “What’s New With Small Business?,” https://advocacy.sba.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2023/03/Whats-New-Infographic-March-2023-508c.pdf (Mar. 2023).
15
Id.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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9. Next, the type of small entity described as a “small organization” is generally “any not-
for-profit enterprise which is independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field.”
16
The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses a revenue benchmark of $50,000 or less to delineate its annual
electronic filing requirements for small exempt organizations.
17
Nationwide, for tax year 2020, there
were approximately 447,689 small exempt organizations in the U.S. reporting revenues of $50,000 or less
according to the registration and tax data for exempt organizations available from the IRS.
18
10. Finally, the small entity described as a “small governmental jurisdiction” is defined
generally as “governments of cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special
districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.”
19
U.S. Census Bureau data from the 2017 Census
of Governments
20
indicate there were 90,075 local governmental jurisdictions consisting of general
purpose governments and special purpose governments in the United States.
21
Of this number, there were
36,931 general purpose governments (county,
22
municipal, and town or township
23
) with populations of
less than 50,000 and 12,040 special purpose governments—independent school districts
24
with enrollment
16
See 5 U.S.C. § 601(4).
17
The IRS benchmark is similar to the population of less than 50,000 benchmark in 5 U.S.C § 601(5) that is used to
define a small governmental jurisdiction. Therefore, the IRS benchmark has been used to estimate the number of
small organizations in this small entity description. See Annual Electronic Filing Requirement for Small Exempt
Organizations – Form 990-N (e-Postcard), “Who must file,” https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/annual-
electronic-filing-requirement-for-small-exempt-organizations-form-990-n-e-postcard. We note that the IRS data
does not provide information on whether a small exempt organization is independently owned and operated or
dominant in its field.
18
See Exempt Organizations Business Master File Extract (EO BMF), “CSV Files by Region,”
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/exempt-organizations-business-master-file-extract-eo-bmf. The IRS
Exempt Organization Business Master File (EO BMF) Extract provides information on all registered tax-
exempt/non-profit organizations. The data utilized for purposes of this description was extracted from the IRS EO
BMF data for businesses for the tax year 2020 with revenue less than or equal to $50,000 for Region 1-Northeast
Area (58,577), Region 2-Mid-Atlantic and Great Lakes Areas (175,272), and Region 3-Gulf Coast and Pacific Coast
Areas (213,840) that includes the continental U.S., Alaska, and Hawaii. This data does not include information for
Puerto Rico.
19
See 5 U.S.C. § 601(5).
20
See 13 U.S.C. § 161. The Census of Governments survey is conducted every five (5) years compiling data for
years ending with “2” and “7”. See also Census of Governments, https://www.census.gov/programs-
surveys/cog/about.html.
21
See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 Census of Governments – Organization Table 2. Local Governments by Type and
State: 2017 [CG1700ORG02], https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html. Local
governmental jurisdictions are made up of general purpose governments (county, municipal and town or township)
and special purpose governments (special districts and independent school districts). See also tbl.2. CG1700ORG02
Table Notes_Local Governments by Type and State_2017.
22
See id. at tbl.5. County Governments by Population-Size Group and State: 2017 [CG1700ORG05],
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html. There were 2,105 county governments
with populations less than 50,000. This category does not include subcounty (municipal and township)
governments.
23
See id. at tbl.6. Subcounty General-Purpose Governments by Population-Size Group and State: 2017
[CG1700ORG06], https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html. There were 18,729
municipal and 16,097 town and township governments with populations less than 50,000.
24
See id. at tbl.10. Elementary and Secondary School Systems by Enrollment-Size Group and State: 2017
[CG1700ORG10], https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html. There were 12,040
independent school districts with enrollment populations less than 50,000. See also tbl.4. Special-Purpose Local
Governments by State Census Years 1942 to 2017 [CG1700ORG04], CG1700ORG04 Table Notes_Special Purpose
Local Governments by State_Census Years 1942 to 2017.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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populations of less than 50,000.
25
Accordingly, based on the 2017 U.S. Census of Governments data, we
estimate that at least 48,971 entities fall into the category of “small governmental jurisdictions.”
26
11. Telemarketing Bureaus and Other Contact Centers. This industry comprises
establishments primarily engaged in operating call centers that initiate or receive communications for
others-via telephone, facsimile, email, or other communication modes-for purposes such as (1) promoting
clients, products, or services, (2) taking orders for clients, (3) soliciting contributions for a client, and (4)
providing information or assistance regarding a client's products or services.
27
These establishments do
not own the product or provide the services they are representing on behalf of clients.
28
The SBA small
business size standard for this industry classifies firms having $16.5 million or less in annual receipts as
small.
29
According to U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017, there were 2,250 firms in this industry that
operated for the entire year.
30
Of this number 1,435 firms had revenue of less than $10 million.
31
Based
on this information, the majority of firms in this industry can be considered small under the SBA small
business size standard.
12. Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite). This industry comprises
establishments engaged in operating and maintaining switching and transmission facilities to provide
communications via the airwaves.
32
Establishments in this industry have spectrum licenses and provide
services using that spectrum, such as cellular services, paging services, wireless Internet access, and
wireless video services.
33
The SBA size standard for this industry classifies a business as small if it has
1,500 or fewer employees.
34
U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 2,893 firms in this
25
While the special purpose governments category also includes local special district governments, the 2017 Census
of Governments data does not provide data aggregated based on population size for the special purpose governments
category. Therefore, only data from independent school districts is included in the special purpose governments
category.
26
This total is derived from the sum of the number of general purpose governments (county, municipal and town or
township) with populations of less than 50,000 (36,931) and the number of special purpose governments -
independent school districts with enrollment populations of less than 50,000 (12,040), from the 2017 Census of
Governments - Organizations tbls. 5, 6 & 10.
27
See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 NAICS Definition,“561422 Telemarketing Bureaus and Other Contact Centers,”
https://www.census.gov/naics/?input=561422&year=2017&details=561422.
28
Id.
29
13 CFR § 121.201, NAICS Code 561422.
30
See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 Economic Census of the United States, Selected Sectors: Sales, Value of Shipments,
or Revenue Size of Firms for the U.S.: 2017, Table ID: EC1700SIZEREVFIRM, NAICS Code 561422,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?y=2017&n=561422&tid=ECNSIZE2017.EC1700SIZEREVFIRM&hidePrevie
w=false.
31
Id. The available U.S. Census Bureau data does not provide a more precise estimate of the number of firms that
meet the SBA size standard. We note that the U.S. Census Bureau withheld publication of the number of firms that
operated with sales/value of shipments/revenue in the individual categories for less than $100,000, and $100,000 to
$249,999, to avoid disclosing data for individual companies (see Cell Notes for the sales/value of shipments/revenue
in these categories). Therefore, the number of firms with revenue that meet the SBA size standard would be higher
than noted herein. We also note that according to the U.S. Census Bureau glossary, the terms receipts and revenues
are used interchangeably, see https://www.census.gov/glossary/#term_ReceiptsRevenueServices.
32
See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 NAICS Definition, “517312 Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except
Satellite),” https://www.census.gov/naics/?input=517312&year=2017&details=517312.
33
Id.
34
13 CFR § 121.201, NAICS Code 517312 (as of 10/1/22, NAICS Code 517112).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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industry that operated for the entire year.
35
Of that number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250
employees.
36
Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report,
as of December 31, 2021, there were 594 providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of
wireless services.
37
Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 511 providers have 1,500 or fewer
employees.
38
Consequently, using the SBA’s small business size standard, most of these providers can be
considered small entities.
E. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements for Small Entities
13. The rules adopted in the Order may result in modified reporting, recordkeeping, or other
compliance requirements for small entities. In cases where consumers invoke their right to grant or
revoke consent to small entity callers to receive robocalls and robotexts under the TCPA, these callers
may need to implement new methods to record and track such revocation requests to honor them within
the specified timeframes. This includes honoring any revocation or do-not-call requests made by any
reasonable means including by using an automated, interactive voice or key press-activated opt-out
mechanism on a call, using the words “stop,” “quit,” “end,” “revoke,” “opt out,” “cancel,” or
“unsubscribe” sent in reply to an incoming text message, or pursuant to a website designated by the caller
when those options are provided by the calling party. In situations where a text initiator chooses to use a
texting protocol that does not allow reply texts, the text initiator must: (1) provide a clear and
conspicuous disclosure in each text to the consumer that two-way texting is not available due to technical
limitations of the texting protocol; and (2) clearly and conspicuously provide reasonable alternative ways
for a consumer to revoke consent, such as a telephone number, website link, or instructions to text a
different number to revoke consent from further unwanted text messages.
14. In addition, callers must process such requests within a reasonable time not to exceed ten
business days of receipt, and within six business days for package delivery services. This may necessitate
small and other entities to update their current systems and processes for handling such requests.
15. There is not sufficient information on the record to quantify the costs of compliance for
small entities, or to determine whether it will be necessary for small entities to hire professionals to
comply with the adopted rules. We note that many of the requirements contained in the Order have been
adopted by the Commission in rulings dating back many years or even decades. As a result, we anticipate
that many callers, including smaller entities, have already made efforts to comply with these obligations
and may have limited new burdens.
F. Steps Taken to Minimize Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities, and
Significant Alternatives Considered
16. The RFA requires an agency to provide, “a description of the steps the agency has taken
to minimize the significant economic impact on small entities...including a statement of the factual,
policy, and legal reasons for selecting the alternative adopted in the final rules and why each one of the
35
See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 Economic Census of the United States, Employment Size of Firms for the U.S.:
2017, Table ID: EC1700SIZEEMPFIRM, NAICS Code 517312,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?y=2017&n=517312&tid=ECNSIZE2017.EC1700SIZEEMPFIRM&hidePrevie
w=false.
36
Id. The available U.S. Census Bureau data does not provide a more precise estimate of the number of firms that
meet the SBA size standard.
37
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Universal Service Monitoring Report at 26, Table 1.12 (2022),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-391070A1.pdf.
38
Id.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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other significant alternatives to the rule considered by the agency which affects the impact on small
entities was rejected.”
39
17. In the Order, the Commission took steps to minimize significant economic impact on
small entities and considered alternatives to the adoption of new rules and processes that may impact
small entities. In response to commenter requests,
40
we provided greater specificity as to the methods that
are deemed reasonable to revoke consent. Taking this step provides callers, including many small
entities, with additional guidance regarding the means to comply with our rules. Alternatively, we
declined to allow callers to designate the use of specific technologies to permit consumers to revoke
consent, such as the use of reply text messages, and grant callers with the flexibility to process revocation
requests by any reasonable means. We also modified our proposal requiring that the revocation of
consent requests and do-not-call requests must be processed within 24-hours. Rather, in response to
concerns from numerous commenters that the 24-hour limitation is not feasible,
41
our amended rules
require such requests be honored within a reasonable time not to exceed ten business days. This provides
callers, including many smaller entities, greater flexibility to process revocation requests that are made via
any reasonable means. Without objection, we also amend the exemption that allows package delivery
notification robocalls and robotexts, with revocation requests now reduced from 30 business days to
requests being honored within a reasonable time not to exceed six business days. In addition to providing
certainty to consumers that their requests are being addressed, there were no objections to this timeframe
and the record reflects that this provides package delivery companies, some of which are small entities, a
reasonable opportunity to process such requests. Finally, we codify into our rules the ability of callers to
send a final, one-time confirmation text in response to a request to opt-out of further messages. This will
benefit both callers and consumers by allowing confirmation of the consumer’s intent to no longer receive
calls or text messages from the caller.
G. Report to Congress
18. The Commission will send a copy of the Order, including this FRFA, in a report to
Congress pursuant to the Congressional Review Act.
42
In addition, the Commission will send a copy of
the Order, including this FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA. A copy of the Order and
FRFA (or summaries thereof) will also be published in the Federal Register.
43
39
5 U.S.C. § 604(a)(6).
40
ABA Comments at 6; EEI Comments at 12 (requesting that the Commission further clarify what methods of
revoking consent are reasonable); NTCA Comments at 1 (encouraging additional guidance); PACE Comments at 4-
6.
41
ABA Comments at 16 (requesting six business days to process revocation requests); ACA Comments at 16
(noting that the other Commission rules allow 10 business days to honor revocation requests); EEI Comments at 15
(10 business days); NAMIC Comments at 3 (not to exceed 14 business days); NTCA et al. Comments at 5 (72
hours); PACE Comments at 7 (five business days); UHG Comments at 3 (14 days); NCLC et al. Reply Comments at
4 (recommending that the Commission allow a longer period for the first year after the regulation goes into effect).
42
5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).
43
See id. § 604(b).
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APPENDIX C
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
1. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended
(RFA)
1
the Commission
has prepared this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the possible significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities by the policies proposed
in this Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (Further Notice). Written public comments are requested on this IRFA.
Comments must be identified as responses to the IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines for comments
in the Further Notice. The Commission will send a copy of this Further Notice, including this IRFA, to
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA).
2
In addition, the Further
Notice and the IRFA (or summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal Register.
3
A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules
2. In the Further Notice, the Commission seeks comment on whether the TCPA applies to
robocalls and robotexts from wireless providers to their own subscribers and therefore such providers
must have consent to make prerecorded voice, artificial voice, or autodialed calls or texts to their own
subscribers. The Commission seeks comment on whether wireless providers satisfy the TCPA’s consent
obligation pursuant to the unique nature of the relationship and service that they provide to their
subscribers.
4
To the extent that wireless providers have consent to robocall or robotext their own
subscribers, the Commission seeks comment on whether wireless subscribers, as any other called party,
can exercise their right to revoke such consent by communicating a revocation of consent request to their
wireless provider and that such request must be honored. Lastly, the Commission seeks comment on a
request to amend our rules to require automated opt-out mechanisms for every non-telemarketing call that
uses an artificial or prerecorded voice that can be used by the called party to stop such calls.
5
B. Legal Basis
3. The proposed action is authorized pursuant to section 227 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 227.
C. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which the Proposed
Rules Will Apply
4. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where feasible, an estimate of
the number of small entities that may be affected by the proposed rules and policies, if adopted.
6
The
RFA generally defines the term “small entity” as having the same meaning as the terms “small business,”
“small organization,” and “small governmental jurisdiction.”
7
In addition, the term “small business” has
1
5 U.S.C. § 603. The RFA, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612, was amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), Pub. L. No. 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 857 (1996).
2
5 U.S.C. § 603(a).
3
Id.
4
See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).
5
See Letter from Margot Saunders, Senior Counsel, NCLC, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, filed in CG
Docket 02-278 (dated Feb. 5, 2024); NCLC et al. Reply Comments at 3.
6
Id. § 603(b)(3).
7
Id. § 601(6).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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the same meaning as the term “small business concern” under the Small Business Act.
8
A “small
business concern” is one which: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field
of operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the SBA.
9
5. Small Businesses, Small Organizations, Small Governmental Jurisdictions. Our actions,
over time, may affect small entities that are not easily categorized at present. We, therefore describe at
the outset, three broad groups of small entities that could be directly affected herein.
10
First, while there
are industry specific size standards for small businesses that are used in the regulatory flexibility analysis,
according to data from the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Office of Advocacy, in general a
small business is an independent business having fewer than 500 employees.
11
These types of small
businesses represent 99.9% of all businesses in the United States, which translates to 33.2 million
businesses.
12
6. Next, the type of small entity described as a “small organization” is generally “any not-
for-profit enterprise which is independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field.”
13
The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses a revenue benchmark of $50,000 or less to delineate its annual
electronic filing requirements for small exempt organizations.
14
Nationwide, for tax year 2020, there
were approximately 447,689 small exempt organizations in the U.S. reporting revenues of $50,000 or less
according to the registration and tax data for exempt organizations available from the IRS.
15
7. Finally, the small entity described as a “small governmental jurisdiction” is defined
generally as “governments of cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special
districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.”
16
U.S. Census Bureau data from the 2017 Census
8
Id. § 601(3) (incorporating by reference the definition of “small-business concern” in the Small Business Act, 15
U.S.C. § 632). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 601(3), the statutory definition of a small business applies “unless an agency,
after consultation with the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and after opportunity for public
comment, establishes one or more definitions of such term which are appropriate to the activities of the agency and
publishes such definition(s) in the Federal Register.”
9
15 U.S.C. § 632.
10
5 U.S.C. § 601(3)-(6).
11
See SBA, Office of Advocacy, “What’s New With Small Business?,” https://advocacy.sba.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2023/03/Whats-New-Infographic-March-2023-508c.pdf (Mar. 2023).
12
Id.
13
See 5 U.S.C. § 601(4).
14
The IRS benchmark is similar to the population of less than 50,000 benchmark in 5 U.S.C § 601(5) that is used to
define a small governmental jurisdiction. Therefore, the IRS benchmark has been used to estimate the number of
small organizations in this small entity description. See Annual Electronic Filing Requirement for Small Exempt
Organizations – Form 990-N (e-Postcard), “Who must file,” https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/annual-
electronic-filing-requirement-for-small-exempt-organizations-form-990-n-e-postcard. We note that the IRS data
does not provide information on whether a small exempt organization is independently owned and operated or
dominant in its field.
15
See Exempt Organizations Business Master File Extract (EO BMF), “CSV Files by Region,”
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/exempt-organizations-business-master-file-extract-eo-bmf. The IRS
Exempt Organization Business Master File (EO BMF) Extract provides information on all registered tax-
exempt/non-profit organizations. The data utilized for purposes of this description was extracted from the IRS EO
BMF data for businesses for the tax year 2020 with revenue less than or equal to $50,000 for Region 1-Northeast
Area (58,577), Region 2-Mid-Atlantic and Great Lakes Areas (175,272), and Region 3-Gulf Coast and Pacific Coast
Areas (213,840) that includes the continental U.S., Alaska, and Hawaii. This data does not include information for
Puerto Rico.
16
See 5 U.S.C. § 601(5).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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of Governments
17
indicate there were 90,075 local governmental jurisdictions consisting of general
purpose governments and special purpose governments in the United States.
18
Of this number, there were
36,931 general purpose governments (county,
19
municipal, and town or township
20
) with populations of
less than 50,000 and 12,040 special purpose governments—independent school districts
21
with enrollment
populations of less than 50,000.
22
Accordingly, based on the 2017 U.S. Census of Governments data, we
estimate that at least 48,971 entities fall into the category of “small governmental jurisdictions.”
23
8. Wireless Carriers and Service Providers. Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except
Satellite) is the closest industry with a SBA small business size standard applicable to these service
providers.
24
The SBA small business size standard for this industry classifies a business as small if it has
1,500 or fewer employees.
25
U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 2,893 firms that
operated in this industry for the entire year.
26
Of this number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250
employees.
27
Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report,
17
See 13 U.S.C. § 161. The Census of Governments survey is conducted every five (5) years compiling data for
years ending with “2” and “7”. See also Census of Governments, https://www.census.gov/programs-
surveys/cog/about.html.
18
See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 Census of Governments – Organization Table 2. Local Governments by Type and
State: 2017 [CG1700ORG02], https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html. Local
governmental jurisdictions are made up of general purpose governments (county, municipal and town or township)
and special purpose governments (special districts and independent school districts). See also tbl.2. CG1700ORG02
Table Notes_Local Governments by Type and State_2017.
19
See id. at tbl.5. County Governments by Population-Size Group and State: 2017 [CG1700ORG05],
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html. There were 2,105 county governments
with populations less than 50,000. This category does not include subcounty (municipal and township)
governments.
20
See id. at tbl.6. Subcounty General-Purpose Governments by Population-Size Group and State: 2017
[CG1700ORG06], https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html. There were 18,729
municipal and 16,097 town and township governments with populations less than 50,000.
21
See id. at tbl.10. Elementary and Secondary School Systems by Enrollment-Size Group and State: 2017
[CG1700ORG10], https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html. There were 12,040
independent school districts with enrollment populations less than 50,000. See also tbl.4. Special-Purpose Local
Governments by State Census Years 1942 to 2017 [CG1700ORG04], CG1700ORG04 Table Notes_Special Purpose
Local Governments by State_Census Years 1942 to 2017.
22
While the special purpose governments category also includes local special district governments, the 2017 Census
of Governments data does not provide data aggregated based on population size for the special purpose governments
category. Therefore, only data from independent school districts is included in the special purpose governments
category.
23
This total is derived from the sum of the number of general purpose governments (county, municipal and town or
township) with populations of less than 50,000 (36,931) and the number of special purpose governments -
independent school districts with enrollment populations of less than 50,000 (12,040), from the 2017 Census of
Governments - Organizations tbls. 5, 6 & 10.
24
See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 NAICS Definition, “517312 Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except
Satellite),” https://www.census.gov/naics/?input=517312&year=2017&details=517312.
25
See 13 CFR § 121.201, NAICS Code 517312 (as of 10/1/22, NAICS Code 517112).
26
See U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 Economic Census of the United States, Employment Size of Firms for the U.S.:
2017, Table ID: EC1700SIZEEMPFIRM, NAICS Code 517312,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?y=2017&n=517312&tid=ECNSIZE2017.EC1700SIZEEMPFIRM&hidePrevie
w=false.
27
Id. The available U.S. Census Bureau data does not provide a more precise estimate of the number of firms that
meet the SBA size standard.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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as of December 31, 2021, there were 594 providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of
wireless services.
28
Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 511 providers have 1,500 or fewer
employees.
29
Consequently, using the SBA’s small business size standard, most of these providers can be
considered small entities.
D. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements for Small Entities
9. The Further Notice seeks comment on issues that may alter the Commission’s current
information collection, reporting, recordkeeping, or compliance requirements for small entities. The
Commission seeks comment on whether wireless providers have effectively obtained consent to make
robocalls and send robotexts to their own subscribers by virtue of their unique relationship with their
subscribers or if they must obtain such consent for robocalls and robotexts. The Commission seeks
comment on whether the right to revoke consent extends to wireless subscribers when they receive
unwanted robocalls and robotexts from their wireless provider, just as it does to any robocalls or robotexts
sent pursuant to the TCPA.
30
In particular, whether wireless providers would be required to honor any
revocation or opt-out requests from their own subscribers that are made through any reasonable means
and at any time. If adopted, this may require wireless providers to obtain consent from their own
subscribers for robocalls and robotexts and may require such providers to maintain records on whether
they have such consent and on any revocation of consent by their subscribers. Additionally, such
revocation may be from all robocalls and robotexts, or from certain ones (such as marketing) and the
wireless providers would be required to maintain such records on the specific revocation requests. We
also seek comment on a request to require every call that uses an artificial or prerecorded voice to provide
an automated opt-out mechanism. There is not sufficient information in the record to quantify the cost of
compliance for small entities, or to determine whether it will be necessary for small entities to hire
professionals to comply with these proposals. The Commission will review the record and further
examine the economic impact of the proposals on small entities following the review of comments filed in
response to the Further Notice.
E. Steps Taken to Minimize Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities, and
Significant Alternatives Considered
10. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant alternatives that could minimize
impacts to small entities that it has considered in reaching its approach, which may include the following
four alternatives, among others: “(1) the establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements
or timetables that take into account the resources available to small entities; (2) the clarification,
consolidation, or simplification of compliance or reporting requirements under the rule for such small
entities; (3) the use of performance, rather than design, standards; and (4) and exemption from coverage
of the rule, or any part thereof, for such small entities.”
31
11. In the Further Notice the Commission seeks comment on several alternatives that may
impact small entities. The Commission seeks comment on whether wireless providers have effectively
obtained consent to make robocalls and send robotexts to their own subscribers by virtue of their unique
relationship with their subscribers and whether this consent extends to telemarketing or other messages,
28
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Universal Service Monitoring Report at 26, Table 1.12 (2022),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-379181A1.pdf.
29
Id.
30
See 2015 TCPA Declaratory Ruling, 30 FCC Rcd at 7993-99, paras. 55-70 (confirming that consumers who have
provided consent to receive autodialed or prerecorded calls may revoke such consent through any reasonable
means).
31
5 U.S.C. § 603(c)(1)–(4).
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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or if providers must obtain consent from their subscribers for such robocalls and robotexts. The
Commission proposes that the right to revoke consent for robocalls and robotexts extends to wireless
subscribers when they receive unwanted robocalls and robotexts from their own wireless provider, just as
it does to any robocalls or robotexts sent to a consumer. The Commission proposes that wireless
providers must honor any revocation or opt-out requests from their own subscribers that are made through
any reasonable means and at any time. This proposal, if adopted, would apply to all wireless providers,
including small entities.
12. This proposal, if adopted, would apply to all wireless providers, including small wireless
entities. The Commission expects that the obligation to honor revocation requests will not be unduly
burdensome to small wireless providers and recognizes that some wireless providers already honor opt-
out requests on many communications to subscribers. The Commission observes that other entities have
implemented such measures to honor revocation requests for decades to comply with the Commission’s
rules. Nevertheless, the Commission seeks comment on ways to reduce any new burdens such
requirements might create for smaller wireless providers. Lastly, the Commission seeks comment on any
burdens imposed by requiring all artificial or prerecorded voice calls to provide an automated opt-out
mechanism to stop such calls including any alternatives that would minimize the impact on small entities.
F. Federal Rules that May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict with the Proposed Rules
13. None.
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APPENDIX D
List of Commenters
Commenter Abbreviation
ACA International et al. ACA
Ad Hoc Telecom Users Committee Ad Hoc
American Bankers Association et al. ABA
AT&T Services, Inc. AT&T
Benefits Data Trust BDT
Cargo Airline Association Cargo
CTIA CTIA
Edison Electric Institute EEI
GECU Federal Credit Union GECU
Illinois Credit Union League Illinois Credit
Mobile Ecosystem Forum MEF
National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies NAMIC
National Consumer Law Center et al. NCLC*
NTCA – The Internet & Television Association NTCA
National Lifeline Association NLA
Professional Associations for Customer Engagement PACE
Service Federal Credit Union SFCU
Kelly Subbaiah Subbaiah
UnitedHealth Group UHG
Verizon Verizon
Vibes Media, LLC Vibes
Marjorie Williams Williams
ZipDX LLC ZipDX
* filing both comment and reply comment (bold - reply comments only)
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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STATEMENT OF
CHAIRWOMAN JESSICA ROSENWORCEL
Re: Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG
Docket No. 02-278, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (February 15,
2024)
Every week, we are looking for news way to quash junk robocalls and robotexts. There is good
reason for this. They are awful, they are annoying, and they are eroding trust in our communications
networks. Because the bad actors behind them won’t stop, neither will we. That is why today we update
our rules under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act to make clear consumers have the right to choose
what calls and texts they receive. We do this because no consumer should be forced to jump through
hoops or say special magic words to stop this junk from reaching them and those who send this nonsense
need to honor your request.
Last week, we also took action to stop the newest form of unwanted communications—robocalls
using Artificial Intelligence voice-cloning technology. We made clear that restrictions on the use of
“artificial or prerecorded voice” in the Telephone Consumer Protection Act apply to calls that use AI to
simulate a human voice. That means when these calls show up, State Attorneys General can go after
those responsible and hold them accountable. In fact, 26 State Attorneys General are already on record
supporting this approach.
One of them, the State Attorney General of New Hampshire, worked with us over the last few
weeks to take action to address fake voice cloned calls that were designed to confuse residents about
when and where to vote during the primary election in the state. He went after the entity responsible for
these calls and we went after the provider carrying the suspected illegal robocall traffic.
In the not-too-distant future we could all be on the receiving end of these fake calls. The law we
have to address this situation is not new, so kudos to Congressman Pallone for introducing the Do Not
Disturb Act to update it, but I want to make clear that when we see problems we will act often and act fast
because we need to get this junk off the line.
Thank you to the Robocall Response Team and staff responsible for this effort, including Aaron
Garza, Wes Platt, Mika Savir, Richard Smith, Mark Stone, and Kristi Thornton from the Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau; Jessica Manuel and Daniel Stepanicich from the Enforcement Bureau;
Richard Mallen and Malena Barzilai from the Office of General Counsel; Mark Montano from the Office
of Economics and Analytics; and Joycelyn James from the Office of Communications Business
Opportunities.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
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STATEMENT OF
COMMISSIONER ANNA M. GOMEZ
Re: Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG
Docket No. 02-278, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (February 15,
2024)
In today’s increasingly digital world, consumers are inundated with information coming through
a variety of different communications channels. Some of these communications provide helpful
information about potential fraud, bank activity, health care appointments, and emergency alerts. But, the
majority of it is junk. Junk robocalls and robotexts make it feel impossible to manage them and
consumers end up ignoring these automated communications entirely, even the helpful ones. Consider
the difficulty of navigating these communications and removing yourself from unwanted lists if you
speak a language other than English.
Today, we update our rules to strengthen consumers’ rights to decide which robocalls and
robotexts they receive. We are making it easier for consumers to remove themselves from spam lists. We
clarify that consumers can opt-out of call or text lists using any reasonable means. We explain that
“reasonable means” of opting-out of automated texts include, but are not limited to: “stop,” “quit,” “end,”
“revoke,” “opt out,” “cancel,” or “unsubscribe.” We clarify that consumers may respond in the language
in which they received the communication. If you get a message in Spanish, you can respond in Spanish
to opt-out. While we provide these as examples, our updates mean that there are no magic words that
consumers must say. This is important.
These updates strike the right balance of ensuring consumers have the ability to easily and
effectively opt out of junk robocalls and robotexts, while remaining connected to the communications
they find helpful.
I want to thank the Office of the Chairwoman and the Consumer and Governmental Affairs
Bureau for working with my office to clarify that consumers can revoke consent by responding in the
language they received the communication.
Federal Communications Commission FCC 24-24
36
DECLARACIÓN DE LA COMISIONADA
ANNA M. GOMEZ
Re: Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG
Docket No. 02-278, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (February 15,
2024)
Hoy en día, en un mundo cada vez más digitalizado, los consumidores se ven inundados por la
información que reciben a través de diversos canales de comunicación. Algunas de estas comunicaciones
son útiles, pero la gran mayoría son de escaso valor. Se trata de lo que conocemos comúnmente como
mensajes “chatarra.” Las llamadas automáticas y los mensajes de texto con contenido “chatarra” parecen
imposibles de manejar, y los consumidores terminan ignorando por completo estas comunicaciones
automatizadas, incluso aquellas que son de utilidad. Ahora, imaginémonos lo difícil que resulta lidiar con
estas comunicaciones y quitar nuestros nombres de listas de mercadeo en las que no queremos figurar,
cuando hablamos un idioma distinto del inglés.
Hoy, estamos actualizando nuestras reglas para fortalecer el derecho de los consumidores a
decidir qué llamadas y textos automatizados están dispuestos a recibir y cuáles no desean recibir.
Estamos facilitando la forma en que los consumidores pueden eliminar sus nombres de las listas de
mercadeo no deseado. Estamos aclarando que los consumidores pueden utilizar cualquier medio
razonable para optar por no figurar en determinadas listas de llamadas o de mensajería de textos.
Clarificamos que los consumidores podrán responder en el idioma de la comunicación que recibieron.
Por lo tanto, si usted recibe un mensaje en español, puede responder en español para que eliminen su
nombre de la lista y no le vuelvan a enviar mensajes. Asimismo, aclaramos que no hay ninguna palabra
mágica que los consumidores necesiten usar. Eso es importante.
Estas actualizaciones logran el equilibrio adecuado para garantizar que los consumidores tengan
la capacidad de optar, de manera fácil y efectiva, por no recibir llamadas automáticas y mensajes de texto
no deseados, y que a la vez permanezcan conectados para recibir las comunicaciones que consideran
útiles.
Quiero agradecer a la oficina de la presidenta de la FCC (OCH) y a la oficina de asuntos
gubernamentales y del consumidor (CGB), por el trabajo realizado en conjunto con mi oficina para
clarificar que los consumidores pueden revocar su consentimiento respondiendo en el idioma de la
comunicación que recibieron.